The Council of Somaliaโs Futureโthe vital opposition coalition uniting Jubbaland, Puntland, and the Somalia Salvation Forumโstands as the last line of defense against the nationโs final disintegration. It is my firm view that the Council should categorically reject the letter and spirit of Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barreโs communiquรฉ dated 19 January 2026.
While the Council originally proposed a national dialogue as a democratic principle and necessity to save the Somali state, the PMโs call for a conference on 1 February 2026 is hollow, unproductive, and fundamentally improper. It is not an invitation to solve a national crisis; it is a summonsโa maneuver to entrench one even deeper.
The Context of Rejection
The PMโs announcement is a belated response to the Councilโs Kismayo Communiquรฉ (20 December 2025), which outlined 17 critical points regarding the deteriorating security, economic, and constitutional situation in Somalia. Central to these crises is the uncertainty of the federal elections scheduled for March 2026.
The Council has unreservedly and blatantly accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of a personal power grab through:
โขโ โ Unconstitutional Mandate Extensions: Arbitrarily extending the terms of federal member states (Galmudug, South West, and Hirshabelle)โan impeachable offense.
โขโ โ Defiling the Social Contract: Unilaterally amending four chapters of the 2012 Provisional Constitution via a bribed and pressured parliament, rocking the very foundations of state-building.
โขโ โ Institutional Sabotage: Engaging in nepotism and corruption while treating the oppositionโa critical stakeholder in any functional democracyโwith visceral disdain.
As of today, Somalia sits at the precipice. By 14 April 2026, the federal parliamentโs mandate ends, creating a dangerous legitimacy vacuum. The only alternative offered by the current administration is an unconstitutional stay in power that will inevitably ignite political turmoil.
Ten Reasons to Reject the PMโs Communiquรฉ
โ1.โ โ Failure to Renounce Constitutional Violations: The 2012 Provisional Constitution is the only legal “binder” of Somali society. The Presidentโs unilateral amendments are null and void, designed only to facilitate the power grab witnessed in the sham Mogadishu local elections. To make matters worse, the President plans to force through the remaining 11 chapters in under 45 daysโa period in which not even minor legislation should be passed, let alone the rewriting of the Federal State Constitution.
โ2.โ โ No to Term Extensions: The Councilโs position is non-negotiable: no extensions. Furthermore, the current PM has forfeited his constitutional responsibilities, ceding all authority to the President, leaving the country effectively without a legitimate caretaker mechanism.
โ3.โ โ The Need for Direct Accountability: The Kismayo communiquรฉ was directed at President Hassan Sheikh as the “sole decider.” For the PM to respond nowโafter years of being a mere attendee at opposition engagementsโis a transparent attempt to shield the President. It is a “good cop, bad cop” routine where the PM plays the organizer while the President continues to reject real issues.
โ4.โ โ Dithering and Delay: This press release is a classic tactic to “push back the clock.” By calling for technical committees to discuss predetermined “formalities,” the government is wasting the few days remaining to ensure elections cannot be held on schedule. On 28 December 2025, President Hassan flatly rejected three suggestions from the Forum for Somaliaโs Salvation regarding a comprehensive national strategy to address foreign interference, domestic polarization, and a unified vision for a legitimate transition.
โ5.โ โ An Affront to Good Faith: The PMโs letter contradicts the personal assurances President Hassan gave to Former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed on 4 January. This inconsistency proves the government has no interest in serious engagement or problem-solving.
โ6.โ โ Misplaced Responsibility: The communiquรฉ places the conference under a ministerial committee that lacks the authority, capacity, or record to settle constitutional questions. These issues fall directly under the President’s jurisdiction; he cannot delegate them away at this late hour simply to buy time and prolong national crises.
โ7.โ โ Intentional Exclusion and Provocation: By unilaterally deciding the date, location, and conference management without consulting the Councilโs leadershipโincluding the Presidents of Puntland and Jubbalandโthe PM has issued a “summons,” not an invitation. This ignores the federal and opposition rights and roles defined under the Provisional Federal Constitution.
โ8.โ โ A History of Deception: President Hassan has a documented habit of using “photo-ops” to mislead the public. Under “divide and rule” tactics, he often reaches agreements with “defection individuals or groups” only to ignore them later. His leadership style relies on performative transactions and abuse of power rather than stewardship for the public interest. Tragically, it appears the President seeks violent political confrontations before entertaining peaceful political solutions.
โ9.โ โ Exploiting National Crisis: The President is using the unlawful Israeli recognition of Somaliland as a “windfall” to delay elections. Influenced MPs are already appearing on television to demand a suspension of the democratic process, asking citizens to “file behind” a leader whose mandate is expiring. This is a dangerous exploitation of national sentiment.
10.โ โ The Lack of Time: With less than 45 days left, the Council cannot afford further dithering. The public is already questioning the effectiveness of the opposition. To engage in this “domestic charade” is to be complicit in the administration’s delay tactics.
Conclusion
The Council for Somaliaโs Future must not be lured into a conference managed “behind the curtain” by the President himself. To accept this communiquรฉ would be to accept the final collapse of the Somali state.
The only way forward is a return to the 2012 Constitution and a transparent, competitive election model. The remaining time allows only for these priorities.
The Council must now engage the international communityโas individual countries and organizationsโto inform them of the political deadlock and the Presidentโs intransigence. If necessary, international partners must resort to the Chapter VII measures already in effect to prevent a total state collapse and protect the 15-year investment in Somaliaโs peace and state-building.
Dr. Mohamud Uluso
